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Abstract  
 
In this paper I will attempt to answer the question of who or what can 
have moral status in the environment in the sense that we show direct 
moral concern and respect toward them. The traditional answer to this 
question has been anthropocentric, where moral status is ascribed only 
to human beings, all or some. I shall argue against this position and in 
favour of a nonanthropocentric position that ascribes moral status to all 
individual organisms, as well as to certain kinds of supra-individual 
wholes such as species-populations, ecosystems, and the biosphere as a 
whole. This corresponds to a combined biocentric and ecocentric 
position. The argument is constructed in part as a Spinozistic argument 
using the conceptual apparatus of Baruch Spinoza’s systematic 
philosophy, but it introduces some additional premises as well. 
 
The Question of Moral Status 
 
The underlying question to be discussed in this paper is: Who or what 
can have a moral status in the environment? There are several 
competing answers to this question, some within a utilitarian 
framework (e.g., Peter Singer), and some within a deontological 
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framework (e.g., Tom Regan). There are still other contributions from 
the viewpoint of virtue ethics (e.g., Rosalind Hursthouse), but this latter 
approach seems to be less explored than the former two. The present 
investigation is an attempt in this latter direction. The argument is 
constructed in part as a Spinozistic argument, and my approach departs 
to some extent from the consequences Spinoza himself drew from his 
fundamental premises. I believe, however, that these are the 
consequences he should have drawn.1
The argument proceeds as follows: first, I sketch some competing 
approaches to the question of moral status, then I outline Spinoza’s 
theory of conation as the descriptive basis for a biocentric and 
ecocentric conception of moral status and follow with a discussion of 
the normative relevance of this position. A basic assumption is that our 
self-conception constitutes the normative basis for either the affirmation 
or denial of moral status to something. Finally, I consider how 
environmental virtue ethics can respond to the challenges offered by a 
combined biocentric and ecocentric position.  
 
Different approaches to the question of moral status 
By way of introduction I would like to give an overview of the main 
approaches to the question of moral status. If we look into the history of 
ethical thinking, we see that this question has been answered in various 
ways. In classical utilitarianism along the lines of Bentham, we find that 
moral status is ascribed to all beings included within the scope of the 
utilitarian principle of maximising happiness, understood as pleasure 
minus pain for all parties concerned. Here the assumption is that all 
living beings capable of feeling pleasure and pain should be included in 
the moral community. Hence, this constitutes the criterion for the 
ascription of moral status. Within the framework of a deontological 
ethic based on duties, moral status is ascribed to all subjects to whom 
we as moral agents have direct duties; and within a deontological ethic 
based on rights, moral status is ascribed to all subjects with basic rights. 
According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, all 
human beings are ascribed equal basic rights. This entails an 
assumption of equal moral status value or inherent dignity.  
Nowadays there is much uncertainty and disagreement with regard to 
the scope of our moral considerations. In this situation, it can be of help 
to clarify the different alternatives as far as possible before settling for a 
position. So far, the utilitarian position and the two deontological 
positions are well worked out within the academic literature. At present, 
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it seems that the position most in need of clarification is the one 
grounded in an ethics of virtue. In this connection, it is of interest to 
observe that the term “environmental virtue ethics” now is becoming 
established within the field of environmental ethics.2 I am not aware, 
however, of anyone who has written on moral status within this frame 
of reference. 
Until now, the prevailing position within Western philosophical and 
theological thinking about moral status has been anthropocentric. This 
implies that if nonhuman nature has been ascribed any value at all, it 
has been mostly instrumental and relative to human ends. The 
anthropocentric positions confine moral status to humans, all or some, 
which means that nonhumans to a large extent have been, and still are, 
excluded from the moral community.  
In contrast to these anthropocentric positions, nonanthropocentric 
positions assume that moral status can be extended to include living 
organisms other than humans. Within these positions, a rough 
distinction is often drawn between individualistic and non-
individualistic or holistic attempts. The individualistic positions assume 
that some or all individual organisms can be ascribed moral status, 
whereas the non-individualistic positions assume that moral status can 
be extended to include supra-individual wholes such as species and 
ecosystems. Important contributors to the individualistic position are 
Peter Singer and Tom Regan. Singer argues that moral status can be 
ascribed to all sentient beings, and believes a moral distinction can be 
drawn somewhere between shrimps and oysters,3 while Regan, on the 
other hand, maintains that we have good reasons for ascribing moral 
status to all living beings that can be “subject for a life.” This includes 
at least all higher mammals and birds.4 Given the fact that Singer 
confines moral status to sentient beings, it follows that all non-sentient 
beings are denied moral status. Regan’s position, moreover, is less 
inclusive than Singer’s, but more inclusive than an anthropocentric 
position. Both of these positions ascribe moral status to some but not all 
nonhumans, and certainly not to plants and micro-organisms, nor to 
supra-individual wholes. 
In addition, there have been attempts to extend the scope of moral status 
to include all individual living organisms, regardless of whether they 
are sentient or not. This is usually called a biocentric position. 
Proponents of this position include Albert Schweitzer, Paul Taylor and 
more recently, Jon Wetlesen.5 Also, there have been attempts to extend 
the scope of moral status to include supra-individual wholes, such as 
species-populations, ecosystems, and so on. This is commonly called an 
ecocentric position. Three examples of this are the land-ethic of Aldo 
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Leopold, Arne Naess’s deep ecology (“Ecosophy T”), and the holism of 
Lawrence Johnson.6  
All these nonanthropocentric positions represent a progression towards 
a higher degree of universalism. This pertains both to the individualistic 
and the holistic attempts. But scarcely any of them, as far as I can see, 
try to combine these two positions. In what follows, I shall attempt such 
a combination and I will base my arguments on certain aspects of 
Spinoza’s philosophy. At first glimpse, however, it may appear that 
Spinoza follows the traditional anthropocentric pattern in Western 
moral thinking. There are several passages in his main work, Ethics, to 
support this claim.7 Nevertheless, as I will argue, the system of Spinoza 
also allows for a nonanthropocentric ethic. This interpretation can be 
defended if we distinguish between, on the one hand, those elements in 
Spinoza’s thought that reveal anthropocentric conceptions of moral 
status, and which all seem to belong to the subordinate parts of his 
system; and, on the other hand, the more fundamental premises in his 
system. I argue that the anthropocentric conceptions are not congruent 
with these fundamental premises. On the contrary, I claim that they give 
rise to nonanthropocentric conceptions of moral status: partly biocentric 
and partly ecocentric conceptions.8  
With this interpretation, I do not claim any inconsistency on the part of 
Spinoza. Rather, I assume that Spinoza, as with most other people, was 
formed in part by his society and culture and that this is reflected in the 
values and norms he endorses. What I want to suggest is that Spinoza, 
in addition to viewing things under the species of eternity (sub specie 
aeternitatis), also viewed things under the species of time (sub specie 
temporis).9 Given the historical dominance of anthropocentrism, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that this view had some influence on the 
person of Baruch Spinoza. Accordingly, I wish to consider the many 
aspects of Spinoza’s philosophical system that, taken as a whole, seem 
to accord with a nonanthropocentric ethic.  
Insofar as we are concerned with the history of ideas, it is of interest 
that Spinoza called his main work Ethics. Here it seems he follows the 
tradition from Aristotle. His book, the Nicomachean Ethics, has 
frequently been, and still is, entitled the Ethics. Aristotle used the word 
ethos (with a long e) to describe a person’s habits and character traits, 
as opposed to ethos (with a short e), which he used to typify customs 
and practices. This last meaning of the word was translated into Latin 
with mos (singular), mores (plural), which formed the basis for moralis 
and our English word “moral.” It seems to me that Spinoza largely 
follows Aristotle in his ethical outlook in view of the classical question 
of how we should live if we wish to be happy, and the assumption that 
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this requires us to develop or form certain types of virtues understood 
as habits, character traits, attitudes, or dispositions. This classical 
(holistic) understanding of teleological ethics is different from the 
consequensialistic type, and also from deontological ethics—both the 
one based on the will of God, and that based on the autonomous will of 
man as in Kant’s philosophy.  
 
Descriptive similarities in light of Spinoza’s  
theory of conation 
I shall return to this classification of Spinoza’s ethics as holistic 
teleological at a later stage. But by way of introducing the term “moral 
status” in relation to Spinoza’s thinking, I shall make the following 
assumption: Spinoza thinks that we show attitudes of direct moral 
concern and respect in relation to some things, and not to others. At this 
point, I introduce the assumption that the former class of things may be 
ascribed moral status, while the latter class is denied moral status. To be 
sure, Spinoza himself does not use the term “moral status.” 
Nevertheless, I think this is a suitable term in this connection with 
regard to what he makes out of the distinction between natural and 
artificial things.10 This distinction can be given a justification in light of 
Spinoza’s theory of striving or conation.11 The Latin word for striving 
is conatus, and the historical roots of this term go back to the Stoics in 
antiquity, as well as to Aristotle’s concept of a teleological striving 
(entelecheia) from potentiality or possibility (dynamis) to actuality or 
reality (energeia).  
I suppose that the presence or absence of conatus in a thing constitutes 
the factual difference that separates the two classes of things, and that 
conation can be used as a morally relevant property and a ground for 
ascribing moral status to all natural things. The assumption is that we 
adopt an attitude of direct moral concern and respect in relation to 
natural things, which we then ascribe moral status. We might also adopt 
an attitude of indirect concern and respect towards artificial things, for 
instance, towards artificial things that are of importance for beings to 
whom we ascribe moral status, but even so, we do not ascribe moral 
status to them. I shall add something more to this argument a little later, 
but first I would like to say something more about conation as the 
descriptive basis for a biocentric and ecocentric position on moral 
status. 
With regard to the conation of an individual, one can say that something 
is in the interest of an organism insofar as it helps or hinders this 
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organism in its striving to preserve itself. According to Spinoza, each 
natural thing strives to persevere in its own being. He calls this striving 
an appetite or need (appetitus) whether the thing is conscious of this 
striving or not; but if the striving is conscious, he calls it a desire 
(cupiditas).12 In view of this, I shall follow the lead of Paul Taylor and 
distinguish between two conditions: first, that a thing or organism has 
an interest in something, and second, that something is in a thing or 
organism’s interest.13 For all beings comprising the first category, the 
assumption is that they can be more or less conscious of the factors 
determining their striving, and so respond with positive or negative 
feelings of joy or sorrow14 toward those things that confirm or check 
their striving. These positive or negative feelings feed back on their 
striving and determine its direction, and perhaps also its strength toward 
or away from something. What is more, these feelings determine the 
desire of the organism to attain whatever is considered to be good and 
to avoid whatever is considered to be bad.  
For all beings comprising the latter category, one can say that 
something is in an organism’s interest even if the organism is not itself 
conscious of this. It can for example be in a plant’s interest to have 
sunlight, water, minerals, and so on, even if it’s not itself conscious of 
this. If the plant receives all of this, it thrives and blossoms; if it 
doesn’t, it languishes and perishes. Understood in this way, the notion 
of “interest” is grounded in the notion of conatus, or made equivalent 
with it. According to this analysis, conation constitutes the foundation 
for a biocentric conception of moral status; it comprises all individual 
living organisms, which at least includes all higher and lower animals, 
plants, micro-organisms, and possibly even more things in the a biotic 
community.15
The next challenge is to work out a similar basis for an ecocentric 
conception of moral status. In view of the preceding argument, I 
suppose this can be formulated as a question of whether or not we can 
ascribe a conation to supra-individual wholes such as species, 
ecosystems etc., on the same basis as with individual organisms. With 
regard to the aforementioned distinction between natural and artificial 
things, a positive answer to this question presupposes attaching supra-
individual wholes to the class of natural things, while a negative answer 
presupposes attaching these wholes to the class of artificial things. 
Given that this last option denies moral status to supra-individual 
wholes, I shall assume that they belong to the class of natural things, 
and with certain qualifications can be ascribed a conation and moral 
status.16  
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As far as the descriptive part of this argument is concerned, it partly 
acquires inspiration from ecological thinking. Within ecology there is 
an assumption that nature can be viewed as a network of systems that is 
hierarchically structured. Smaller systems function within the 
framework of bigger systems, from organisms downwards to organs, 
cells, molecules, and atoms, and from organisms upwards to species-
populations, ecosystems, the biosphere, the planetary system around our 
sun, the galaxy, and the group of galaxies. At least some of these 
systems may perhaps be ascribed a conation of their own, and be 
understood as cybernetic systems. If we return to Spinoza, I believe we 
find similar observations concerning nature’s networks of systems. 
Spinoza has what in recent times has been called a “holographic” 
understanding of nature.17 In his physics, he develops a theory of simple 
and composed individuals that is very much in agreement with modern 
systems theory.18 According to this view, the world can be 
characterized in terms of “systems” or “holons,” where each individual 
or system is a “whole” that is more than the sum of its parts, but also 
itself a “part” of larger individuals or systems.19  
Moreover, nature’s parts can be thought of as homeostatic systems that 
maintain nature’s stability and sustainability with the help of internal 
interactions.20 These internal interactions steer the preservation of the 
system as a whole, but the system’s equilibrium can nevertheless be 
weakened by external causes (e.g., by human interference), with the 
result that these external causes feed back on the system (cf. feedback 
loop) and constitute a co-determining factor for the system’s future 
direction and strength. In view of this, I think one can say that 
something is in such a system’s interest insofar as it helps or hinders the 
system’s ability to maintain it self, that is, preserve diversity and 
stability. Also, it can be said to be in an ecosystem’s interest that its 
single units or parts collaborate and that, if they do so, it maintains the 
system’s stability, but if it fails, the system collapses. The same seems 
to apply to the biosphere as a whole.  
The question now is whether we can say something similar with regard 
to species-populations. One possible answer is that there are factors that 
co-determine whether or not a species-population is able to preserve 
itself in the environment. It can undergo great damage and nevertheless 
maintain or rebuild its population, but if the damages become too 
severe, it might be unrepairable and result in the species dying out. 
Here we should note that we of course cannot injure a species-
population without at the same time injuring some or all of the 
individual organisms that make up the population. Likewise, we can 
fulfil the criteria set out from the viewpoint of environmental protection 
(or protection of supra-individual wholes) without fulfilling those set 
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out from the viewpoint of animal protection (or protection of individual 
living organisms). Here the assumption is that, insofar as one doesn’t 
push a system further than its limits for sustainability, this gives no 
protection for the individuals being killed. This argument is often used 
as a justification for handing out catch quotas in fisheries and the 
sealing and whaling industries.  
As regards conation and its range of application, I suppose something 
can be said to be in a certain species-population’s interest in that it 
supports or checks the species` ability to maintain the population. If it 
succeeds in doing so the species is sustainable, or at least survives; if it 
fails, the species is extinguished.21 In sum, I argue that Spinoza’s 
concept of conation contains a reasonably wide class of natural things 
so as to include all individual living organisms. What is more, it also 
includes some or all homeostatic and cybernetic systems, such as 
species, ecosystems, the ecosphere and biosphere as a whole—and 
perhaps several other things in the environment with relevant structures 
that seek self-maintenance, such as habitats, landscapes, and so on.  
 
Should moral status be understood as intrinsic or inherent 
value? 
The notion of moral status presupposes the notion of “moral status 
value.” There are two terms that are commonly used in this connection: 
“intrinsic value” and “inherent value.” Unfortunately, there is no 
uniform usage of these terms in the environmental literature: some 
commentators use intrinsic value where others use inherent value.22 
Traditionally, however, there has been a tendency to apply the term 
intrinsic value to an object when it makes sense to do something for this 
object’s own sake. In contrast to intrinsic value, there is instrumental 
value, which refers to the kind of value an object is ascribed in relation 
to its usefulness for human ends.  
Furthermore, intrinsic value has been used within a teleological ethic, 
but differently within a consequensialistic and a holistic teleological 
ethic.23 In a consequensialistic teleological ethic the assumption is that 
only the fruits or results of our actions can have value in themselves, 
whereas in a holistic teleological ethic the assumption is that actions 
can have value in themselves insofar as they are motivated by virtue. As 
regards inherent value, this term has usually been used within a 
deontological ethic. In a duty-based ethic, one assumes that moral 
agents have direct moral duties against those subjects that are ascribed 
moral status. These duties can be used to ground the subject’s rights. 
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But in a right-based ethic, the argument goes the other way around. 
Here the assumption is that these subjects have certain rights, and that 
these rights are correlated with other agents’ direct duties.  
As regards the notions of intrinsic and inherent value, they do not 
appear in the system of Spinoza. Seemingly, this offers a problem with 
regard to the application of modern ethical terminology to his thought. 
Still, I think there is a way out of this dilemma. As mentioned earlier, I 
take Spinoza’s ethics to be of the holistic teleological kind, where the 
concept of virtue or power (virtus)24 is held to be a requirement for the 
realization of the highest good and most final goal. Indeed, it may also 
be characterized as an ethics of virtue parallel to that of Aristotle. 
According to Spinoza, the highest good and most final goal of human 
striving is the attainment of blessedness (beatitudo), understood as 
freedom (libertas) or self-determination.25 Insofar as a person is able to 
achieve this freedom, he or she will form and develop what Spinoza 
calls active affects or desires (virtues), such as fortitude (fortitudo) and 
intellectual love of God (amor intellectualis Dei).26  
Moreover, these effects or virtues form the basis for the development of 
certain kinds of attitudes or dispositions. Now if we assume, for the 
sake of the argument ahead, that these virtues consist of attitudes 
expressing respect and concern for something, then I believe we can 
make the further assumption that those things, toward which these 
attitudes are taken in a direct manner, are ascribed moral status. But 
there is still the problem of how moral status is to be understood in this 
connection—as an intrinsic or as an inherent value. Some might object 
at this point on the grounds that this is a somewhat trivial problem: it 
doesn’t make an important difference whether we use the term intrinsic 
value or inherent value. However, in light of the widespread and often 
diverse use of these terms, it will be useful to attempt to clarify them 
somewhat more. Allow me, therefore, to make an effort to do so with 
the anticipation that it will be useful for the reconstruction of Spinoza.  
Despite the fact that inherent value has been used within a 
deontological ethic, and intrinsic value within a teleological ethic,27 
along with the fact that Spinoza’s ethics is of the teleological kind, I 
shall attempt to maintain a distinction between intrinsic and inherent 
value, but in such a way that they may be combined. Consider, 
therefore, the following argument. Insofar as a thing is ascribed a value 
in itself by a person, it has intrinsic value; but insofar as a certain 
agreement exists on the thing’s value among a group of persons, and 
this belief is institutionalized in the group, the thing is ascribed an 
inherent value as a moral status value.28 From the viewpoint of 
Spinoza’s teleological ethic, moral status is introduced in relation to 
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persons’ attitudes of direct concern and respect, and ascribed to those 
beings that these attitudes are taken in relation to. These beings are then 
ascribed intrinsic value. But insofar as a group of persons reach an 
agreement on the being’s intrinsic value, this will contribute to 
transforming this intrinsic value into an inherent moral status value. 
This inherent value is then ascribed to those beings which have a 
conation or striving, and it is ascribed to these beings in their own right. 
In this way, the norm of moral status is internalized intrapersonally 
within each person and institutionalized interpersonally among these 
persons as a common praxis. On this view, moral status incorporates 
both intrinsic value and inherent value.  
Furthermore, I recommend that we distinguish between two types of 
factors in connection with the ascription of moral status value. First, the 
relation to the valuing subject, for example, one who ascribes intrinsic 
value to certain things;29 and second, these things’ factual or subvenient 
properties that are considered to be normatively relevant. If these 
properties are considered to be necessary conditions, things lacking 
them (that is, which are believed by the person to lack them), are denied 
moral status. If the properties are considered to be sufficient conditions, 
then things that have them (that is, which are believed by the person to 
have them), are ascribed moral status. Thus, a distinction is made 
between a thing having certain factual properties (or is thought to have 
certain factual properties), and the fact that these properties are 
considered to be normatively or morally relevant for the ascription of 
moral status. With regard to the latter, these factual properties 
(conation) can be said to be subvenient, while the normative terms, such 
as moral status, are supervenient. 
The Question of Normative Relevance  
So far the argument has focused on the descriptive factors of relevance 
for a theory of moral status. According to Spinoza’s theory of conation, 
all individual organisms as well as some or all supra-individual wholes 
such as ecosystems, species-populations, and so on, can be ascribed a 
conation of their own. This is relevant to a combined biocentric and 
ecocentric conception of moral status. Still, the normative or moral 
relevance of such a position remains to be determined. We might ask in 
what way the conation or interests of individual organisms and supra-
individual wholes can make any moral claims on us, or how we do 
determine whether a property, such as conation, is morally relevant or 
not. 
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In the case of Spinoza, the hypothesis is that conation is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the ascription of moral status. 
This implies making a descriptive assumption as to the existence of this 
striving, and a normative assumption as to the moral relevance of this 
property. However, in order to determine the moral relevance of an 
individual’s conation or striving, we need an argument that does not 
proceed strictly from a set of descriptive premises to a normative 
conclusion. Rather, we need one that proceeds from at least one 
normative premise to a normative conclusion. From the point of view of 
modern ethics, this is a familiar problem; however, I am glad to notice 
that Christine Korsgaard recently has proposed an interesting theory for 
its solution.30 Korsgaard’s answer takes the form of a “theory of 
reflective endorsement,” where the assumption is that certain factual 
properties (such as conation) are normatively relevant grounds for the 
ascription of moral status insofar as these properties correspond with 
conceptions of practical personal identity. What sort of practical 
personal identity one has depends on what one has cognitively 
identified and affectively attached oneself to—in other words, what one 
has endorsed.31  
Let us suppose that a person identifies himself with his sex, his race, his 
skin colour, his language, his religion, his political opinions, his nation, 
his social heritage, his property, and so on. In this case, the person will 
be disposed to recognize these properties as morally relevant grounds 
for an equal treatment of those individuals who possess these 
properties, and for a differential treatment of those who lack them. This 
leads to a particularistic attitude. On the other hand, suppose that a 
person simply identifies herself with her own conation or striving, 
which is a common characteristic of all living beings, individual 
organisms as well as supra-individual wholes. In this case, the person 
will be disposed to recognize this property as a morally relevant ground 
for extending her attitudes of direct moral concern and respect to all 
natural things, including animals, plants, micro-organisms, and 
ecosystems. This leads to a universalist attitude. 
In my opinion, this approach to normativity has a lot to offer in the 
sense of determining the sources of our moral values and norms. In fact, 
I believe a similar kind of endorsement theory is tacitly assumed in 
Spinoza’s system and may be reconstructed from it. Spinoza himself 
has some interesting things to say of relevance for such a theory, but he 
does not go into it in great detail. What he does say, however, appears 
to have a great potential in determining the sources of normativity. 
Partly inspired by Korsgaard, I will now go on to outline some of 
Spinoza’s premises which I think harmonize with a kind of reflective 
endorsement theory, and which ultimately have relevance for the 
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question at hand, namely how we determine the normative relevance of 
a biocentric and ecocentric position on moral status. Instead of 
Korsgaard’s term “practical personal identity,” I shall be using the 
terms “self-concept” and “self-conception” to signify the sources of 
normativity. 
The concept of “self” in Spinoza 
Crucial to the understanding of Spinoza’s philosophy is his concept of 
striving or conation. This concept has a universal range of application 
that goes all the way from individual things, such as living organisms, 
to supra-individual wholes such as ecosystems. If we confine ourselves 
to persons, we find that conation clearly has reference to a self; hence, 
the central question becomes what kind of self or self-conception we 
have. This is an important point, since our self-conception in the 
following will form the basis for either the affirmation or denial of 
moral status to something.  
Based on a careful reading of Spinoza’s philosophy, I shall attempt to 
reconstruct two conceptions of the self as follows: one individualistic 
self-conception at the level of the first kind of cognition; and one 
interpersonal and holistic self-conception at the level of the second or 
third kind of cognition. Before proceeding with the argument, let me 
exemplify these conceptions of the self and their bearing on the 
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Suppose I form and develop an individualistic self-conception. This 
individualistic self-concept will depend on what Spinoza calls the first 
kind of cognition (cognitionem primi generis), at the level of opinion 
(opinionem) and imagination (imaginationem).32 The first kind of 
cognition is inadequate and entails a partial and fragmented conception 
of God, oneself, and other things. This fragmented conception of God 
involves an ignorance of the fact that each individual or mode (modus) 
is an expression of God’s essence or nature.33 It also entails an 
ignorance of the fact that God’s essence is the internal cause of the 
essence of each mode, insofar as these essences are understood as 
eternal truths. According to Spinoza, God’s power or existence is the 
internal cause of the existence or striving of each mode or individual 
being.34  
Essential to the metaphysics of Spinoza is, moreover, the distinction 
between two aspects of God or nature: the creative or generating nature 
(natura naturans), and the created or generated nature (natura 
naturata).35 I consider this distinction to be of relevance to Spinoza’s 
ethical outlook. Insofar as it is interpreted as a unity/diversity relation, 
God will function as the internal unity (natura naturans) in nature as a 
whole (natura naturata), as well as in each single part. Moreover, the 
term God refers to that which is in itself and is conceived through 
itself—a substance—and it is argued that God is absolutely infinite. 
And since God is absolutely infinite, God must be indivisible, and as 
God is the cause of itself as well as of the modes, God must be equally 
present in all its effects and totally present in parts and in whole. This 
has the further implication that the modes are only modally and not 
substantially separate from each other, and so they must be internally 
united through God as their common internal cause. On this 
interpretation, I believe Spinoza becomes a panentheist rather than a 
pantheist, as it is often assumed—all modes are present in God and God 
is present in all the modes.  
By way of this analysis, we may now determine more concretely the 
normative relevance of these premises. Insofar as I have an inadequate 
cognition of God, I will form and develop an inadequate conception of 
myself. Inasmuch as I do this, I will be ignorant of the fact that I have 
this internal relation to nature as a whole.36 This implies that, as a 
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person, I will have an external rather than an internal relation to the 
other modes or parts. As it is, however, I may have an internal relation 
to some parts, for example to my family and friends, the members of 
my religion, or to the class of human beings. But, given the inadequacy 
of my cognition, it is unlikely that I will have this kind of internal 
relation to the whole of nature—the reason being that inadequate 
cognition merely brings about identification with fragments of what it 
means to be a person. Such fragments can include the ability to be a 
moral person or a moral agent, to have a rational faculty and a free will, 
and so on, but these abilities are hardly exhaustive of me as a person.  
If we turn to the biological classification of Aristotle, this can perhaps 
be illustrated as follows: Insofar as I have an inadequate cognition of 
myself, I will only come to identify with the rational (lógos) part of my 
soul (psuchê), which specifically belongs to human beings. But apart 
from the rational part, I have the appetitive (tò epithumetikòn) part in 
common with animals, and the vegetative (tò phutikòn) or nourishing 
(tò threptikòn) part in common with plants. These abilities belong to the 
irrational (alagos) part of my soul. Those abilities that I have in 
common with animals are, therefore, together with conation or striving, 
also the capacity for perception, movement, and so on. In common with 
plants, I have the ability for striving, such as nourishing, growth, and 
reproduction.37 This, I believe, is more or less in accordance with the 
premises associated with Spinoza’s theory of conation outlined 
earlier.38
From these premises, we may surmise that a requirement for showing 
attitudes of direct moral concern and respect towards others is a sense 
of identification with the abilities and properties that these beings have 
in common with us. Descriptively, I supposedly have no properties in 
common with other living beings; normatively, this negation of any 
affiliation with nonhumans takes on a moral relevance insofar as it is 
endorsed as part of my self-conception. Consequently, I will ascribe 
moral status (intrinsic value) to those parts to which I have an internal 
relation, and I will deny moral status (or ascribe instrumental value) to 
those parts to which I have an external relation. The former class of 
parts become the objects of direct moral concern and respect, whereas 
the latter class merely become the objects of indirect moral concern and 
respect. Subsequently, in my individualistic self-conception, there will 
be divisibility between the parts, and the assumption is that I shall not 
be motivated to promote the welfare or interests of those parts or living 
beings to which I have this kind of external relation—at least not if the 
welfare of these beings conflict with my own welfare, or the pursuing 
of my own interests.  
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Based on the foregoing analysis, I argue that if I develop an 
individualistic conception of myself, then I will be disposed to accept 
an anthropocentric conception of moral status.  
 
 
An interpersonal and holistic conception of the self 
Suppose instead that I form and develop an interpersonal and holistic 
self-conception. This self-conception will have its ultimate source in 
what Spinoza calls reason (ratio), corresponding to the second kind of 
cognition (cognitio secundi generis), or intuition (scientia intuitiva) 
corresponding to the third kind of cognition (cognitio tertii generis). 
Both the second and third kinds of cognition are adequate and involve a 
complete or total understanding of God or nature.39
In contrast to the individualistic self-conception of inadequate 
cognition, this adequate cognition implies that the more I understand 
myself in relation to God or nature, the more I understand myself as 
internally related to all other modes or parts through our common 
internal cause, which is God or the eternal and infinite substance.40 
Consequently, I will not only understand myself as part of a particular 
group (e.g., my family, political party, nation, class of humans etc.), but 
as internally connected with all other parts of nature as a whole. Insofar 
as I come to develop this kind of understanding, I will have a deeper 
notion of myself as internally related to all of nature’s parts, and this 
will imply indivisibility. Since God is absolutely infinite and 
indivisible, God must be equally present in all its effects, and equally 
present in the part as in the whole. In developing an interpersonal 
holism of this kind, I come to form an internal relation to each of 
nature’s parts as well as to nature as a whole. “The more we understand 
particular things, the more we understand God.”41 In so doing, I 
develop my conception of myself through a process of identification 
with the other parts and, by means of this identification, I am able to 
incorporate the other parts into my conception of myself at a deeper 
level of self-understanding.  
Furthermore, we may compare with this notion of interpersonal holism 
the field theoretical understanding of the organism as a “hologram” as 
held by David Bohm.42 According to Bohm, each field is considered to 
be infinite, each part of the universe that we isolate and identify 
conceptually, is part of a field that is infinite and indivisible. On this 
view, fragmentation is a conceptual construct that can only have 
conventional validity. The ontological reality is the interconnectedness 
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of all “parts” of the field. What this suggests is that, if I am able to 
achieve an internal relation to one part of this field, then my relation to 
this part will involve a relation to the whole. Thus, it is indivisibility at 
the deepest level—positively separating Spinoza’s holism from every 
type of atomistic conception of the parts. In contrast to the atomists, 
Spinoza does not assume that this analysis ends in the smallest 
indivisible parts. Where an analysis of parts should end is in fact a 
practical question, and any answer to it will have only conventional 
validity. 
So, by means of this interpersonal and holistic self-understanding, I will 
ascribe intrinsic value to those parts that have an internal relation to me. 
Descriptively, I have a number of properties in common with other 
living beings; normatively, these properties take on a moral relevance in 
that they are endorsed as part of my self-conception. Insofar as I 
recognize a basic similarity between myself and other individuals in 
terms of a conation or striving, I will have normative grounds for 
treating these individuals in a relevant equal manner. My self-concept 
will then be used as a ground for a normative prescription: To desire for 
others what I desire for myself.43 Additionally, inasmuch as this desire 
(fortitudo) is anchored in my intuitive understanding under the 
viewpoint of eternity (sub specie aeternitatis), I will be motivated by an 
intellectual love of God (amor intellectualis Dei) and towards each 
mode or part as myself (amor erga proximum).44 Indeed, by partaking 
in this love of God, I will have a deeper sense of identification with the 
needs and wants of all beings or modes. Through this identification, I 
obtain an attitude of direct concern and respect for the integrity and 
self-determination of an individual organism or system, including 
permitting it to function spontaneously in accordance with its own 
nature. What is more, to have direct concern and respect for another 
being is to accept that that being has moral status, a value in its own 
right. To express this concern and respect is to act towards those beings 
so as to convey my recognition of that value.  
From the above remarks it follows that I will have a more universalistic 
and inclusive self-understanding, and one that necessarily forms the 
basis for a nonanthropocentric conception of moral status. Moreover, 
insofar as a group of persons all share this interpersonal and holistic 
self-conception, and each person cognizes that the other persons 
cognize and recognize a biocentric and ecocentric position of moral 
status, and everyone agrees to the recognition of such a position, this 
will contribute to convert or transform this intrinsic value into an 
inherent moral status value. On this view, the moral validity of the 
norm of moral status can be said to be relative to the recognition of this 
norm within a group of persons.45






How should environmental virtue ethics respond to the 
problem of conflicts of interest? 
So far, I have not discussed the problems raised by a combination of 
biocentrism and ecocentrism. Some would say that by arguing for such 
a position, we necessarily face some difficult tasks with regard to the 
resolution of conflicts of interest. Personally, I think some of this 
concern is warranted; however, as I shall argue, there is room for 
optimism on the part of environmental virtue ethics.  
Let me first point out a frequent problem facing this combined position. 
According to ecocentrism, the basic criterion for right action is the 
tendency of the action to preserve ecological integrity in the 
environment in which the action takes place. But such a holistic view 
incorporates no assumption that we have responsibility toward 
individual living organisms, each of which is regarded as possessing 
moral status. Since we aim at a combination of biocentrism and 
ecocentrism, whenever we cause harm to individual organisms, such as 
animals and plants, recognition must be given to the fact that our 
treatment of them is morally problematic. 
It remains to decide how these competing claims are to be resolved, if 
possible. For my part, I am somewhat hesitant when it comes to finding 
straightforward solutions to such conflicts of interest. From the point of 
view of Spinoza’s holism, however, I suppose our main choice of 
concern will be determined by how we understand the relation between 
part and whole. If we understand the single parts as more than parts of a 
whole, then we will probably give our support to a biocentric position. 
If, on the other hand, we understand the parts only in terms of their 
function within the whole, then we are most likely to give our support 
to an ecocentric position. In any case, we may ask whether supra-
individual wholes, such as an ecosystem, have intrinsic properties that 
are not inherited from their parts alone, or if they merely have the 
properties inherited from their various parts? In the former case such 
wholes are considered to be more than the sum of their parts, whereas 
in the latter case they are mere sums of parts. We need not here provide 
a general answer to the problem of reductionism; still, from the earlier 
discussions on cybernetic and homeostatic systems, I believe it is 
reasonable to assume that there is a sense in which such wholes are 
more than the sum of their parts. Similarly, I believe we can infer that 
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individual organisms are more than mere parts of supra-individual 
wholes. These individual organisms are not ascribed a moral status 
value on account of their function as parts of a whole. Rather, they are 
ascribed this value for their intrinsic properties in terms of a striving or 
conation. This striving can thus not be reduced to a mere functioning of 
the striving of the whole of which the organism is a part. 
Given that we recognize the moral status of individual organisms, 
species-populations and ecosystems, the task of reconciling the interests 
of all parties concerned necessarily becomes problematic. I have to 
submit that this position is morally demanding, and some answers may 
be better than others; yet, no theory alone is adequate to settle every 
conflict of interest. These competing claims are of such a complex 
nature that no solution by reference to any single principle alone will 
suffice. With that in mind, I recommend that we consider more closely 
the prospective of environmental virtue ethics. The strength of this 
approach lies in the fact that it emphasizes the importance of forming 
and developing attitudes and dispositions that enable us to have direct 
concern and respect for others, rather than attempt to formulate norms 
or policies for every conceivable situation. From this point of view, the 
formulations of norms or guiding lines become a secondary issue, 
dependent upon our ability to form and develop relevant attitudes and 
dispositions. Our attitudes of direct concern and respect for persons and 
individual organisms are grounded on their ability for striving or 
conation, their capacity to experience pain and happiness, enjoy success 
and suffer affliction.46 With regard to supra-individual wholes, the case 
is a similar one. Our direct concern and respect for the welfare and self-
determination of the parties concerned are grounded on their ability to 
sustain and reproduce—from which, in the end, both we and other 
living beings may benefit. 
On account of this, we may desire not to cause avoidable harm to other 
beings, or we may desire to actively contribute to preventing avoidable 
harm being caused to other beings—or generally to promote the welfare 
of others as far as possible. A basic question, however, concerns which 
human ends and needs justify depriving other humans and nonhumans 
of the opportunity to pursue their essential interests and thereby to 
satisfy their vital needs. In the present situation, it is apparent that 
human peripheral needs and interests are given priority over the 
essential or vital needs and interests of other humans and nonhumans. A 
case in point is the meat-eating culture, which ultimately affects 
humans and animals as well as the ecological balance of ecosystems, 
species, and the biosphere as a whole.  
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My assumption is that, by acknowledging the moral status of 
nonhumans, we will be liable to renounce our nonbasic needs and 
interests if the pursuing of these needs and interests presuppose the 
suffering, or even death, of nonhumans. In fact, if we were to fulfil 
those needs and interests, it would imply recognizing the mere 
instrumental value of these beings. But through recognition of the moral 
status value of living beings, we naturally give up several of those 
needs that are no longer essential for our welfare, and by way of this 
attitude we give priority to the sort of values that do not come into 
conflict with the basic needs and interests of others. Possibly, this will 
form the basis for life forms which, according to Arne Naess, are “rich 
in means and simple in ends,” or which, according to Duane Elgin, are 
“outwardly simple and inwardly rich.”47  
Nevertheless, as human beings, we must eat in order to survive, and so 
it is necessary for us to take the lives of nonhumans. Since it is 
impossible for us to avoid harming other living beings, we are forced to 
make some essential value choices and priorities. For my part, I am 
committed to the view that, if we accept that animals have a higher 
moral standing than plants, then we may well be committed to a life as 
vegetarians. In the end, it is how we conceive ourselves as human 
beings that will determine our value priorities. However, a shift from 
meat-eating to vegetarianism will be of substantial value to the welfare 
of both individual organisms and for the preservation and sustainability 
of ecosystems, species-populations and the biosphere as a whole. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper I have raised the question of who or what can have moral 
status in the environment and have argued for a combined biocentric 
and ecocentric answer in light of Spinoza’s philosophy. This position 
does not follow from the underlying anthropocentric premises in 
Spinoza’s thinking, but from the more fundamental premises, which 
give rise to nonanthropocentric conceptions of moral status, partly 
biocentric, and partly ecocentric. What is the moral relevance of this 
position?  
I have argued for a virtue ethics approach to this problem, where the 
crucial point is how we conceive of ourselves as human beings. Insofar 
as we form and develop an interpersonal and holistic conception of 
ourselves, we will acknowledge that there are certain similarities 
between ourselves and other beings, such as a striving for self-
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preservation. Moreover, we will endorse this ability as part of our self-
conception, and thus have reasons for recognizing their normative 
relevance as grounds for extending moral status from ourselves to other 
living organisms, species-populations, ecosystems, and the biosphere as 
a whole. The recognition of such a position will no doubt contribute to 
upgrading the nonhuman nature from being mere objects with 
instrumental value to being parts of our moral community and worthy 
of our moral consideration.  
 
References 
Cafaro, Philip, and Ronald Sandler, eds. 2005. Environmental Virtue 
Ethics. New York: Rowan and Littlefield. 
Collier, Andrew. 1999. Being and Worth. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Elgin, Duane.1993. Voluntary Simplicity. Toward a Way of Life that Is 
Outwardly Simple, Inwardly Rich. New York: Quill, William 
Morrow. 
Foster, Susanne E. 2002. Aristotle and the Environment. Environmental 
Ethics 24: 409–428. 
Johnson, Lawrence E. 1991. A Morally Deep World. An Essay on 
Moral Significance and Environmental Ethics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Koestler, Arthur. 1979. Janus: A Summing Up. London: Pan Books. 
Korsgaard, Christine M. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press. 
Leopold, Aldo. 1949. A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and 
There. London: Oxford Univ. Press. 
Lovelock, James E. 1979. GAIA, A New Look at Life on Earth. Oxford: 
Oxford Univ. Press. 
Mathews, Freya. 1991. The Ecological Self. London: Routledge. 
Newcomb, Theodore M. 1966. Social Psychology. The Study of Human 
Interaction. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Næss, Arne. 1973. The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology 
Movements: A Summary. Inquiry 16: 95–100.  
The Trumpeter 22 
 
 
———. 1977. Spinoza and Ecology. Speculum Spinozanum 1677-1977 
edited by S Hessing, 418–425. London: Routledge. 
———. 1983. The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical 
Aspects. Philosophical Inquiry 8 (1-2): 1031.  
———. 1989. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an 
Ecosophy. Translated by David Rothenberg. Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press. 
———. 1999. Environmental Ethics and Spinoza`s Ethics: Comments 
on Genevieve Lloyds Article, in Philosophical Dialogues: Arne 
Næss and the Progress of Ecophilosophy, edited by Nina 
Witoszek and Andrew Brennan, 91–101. Boston: Rowan & 
Littlefield. 
O` Neill, John, R., Kerry Turner, & Ian J. Bateman, eds. 2001. 
Environmental Ethics and Philosophy. Managing the 
Environment for Sustainable Development. Cheltenham, UK: 
Elgar. 
Palmer, Joy A., ed. 2001. Fifty Key Thinkers on the Environment. 
London: Routledge. 
Regan, Tom. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University 
of California Press. 
Rolston, Holmes. 1988. Environmental Ethics. Duties and Values in the 
Natural World. Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press. 
Sayre, Kenneth M. 1976. Cybernetics and the Philosophy of Mind. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Shaw, Bill. 1997. A Virtue Ethics Approach to Aldo Leopold’s Land 
Ethic. Environmental Ethics 19: 53–67. 
Singer, Peter. 1975. Animal Liberation, A New Ethic for Our Treatment 
of Animals. New York: Avon Books.  
Spinoza, Baruch. 1925. Opera, edited by C. Gebhardt. Heidelberg. 
Taylor, Paul W. 1981. The Ethics of Respect for Nature. Environmental 
Ethics 3: 197–218.  
———. 1986. Respect for Nature. A Theory of Environmental Ethics. 
Princeton, N J: Princeton Univ. Press. 
Wetlesen, Jon. 1993. Who Has a Moral Status in the Environment? in 
Culture and Environment – Interdisciplinary Approaches, edited 
Volume 23, Number 1 23
by N. Witoszek and E. Gulbrandsen, 98–129. Oslo: University 
of Oslo. 
———. 1996. Value in Nature: Intrinsic or Inherent? in Rethinking 
Deep Ecology. Proceedings from a seminar at SUM, University 
of Oslo, 5 September 1995, edited by N. Witoszek, 61–87. Oslo: 
University of Oslo.  
———. 1999. The Moral Status of Beings Who are not Persons: A 
Casuistic Argument. Environmental Values 8 (3): 287–323. 
Wilber, Ken. 1982. The Holographic Paradigm and Other Paradoxes. 
Exploring the Leading Edge of Science. Boulder, CO: 
Shambhala. 
Witoszek, Nina, and Andrew Brennan, eds. 1999. Philosophical 
Dialogues. Arne Næss and the Progress of Ecophilosophy. 
Boston: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 I use the following abbreviations when referring to Spinoza’s Ethics: Df – definitio, 
e.g.: 1Df1 – part 1, definition 1; Ex – explicatio, e.g.: 1Df6Ex – explanation to 
definition 6 in part 1; A – axioma, e.g.: 1A1 – part 1, axiom 1; P – propositio, e.g.: 
1P1 – part 1, proposition 1; D – Demonstratio, e.g.: 1P1D – demonstration to 
proposition 1 in part 1; S – scholium, e.g.: 1P8S1 – the first scholium after proposition 
8 in part 1; C – corollarium, e.g.: 1P6C – the corollary after proposition 6 in part 1; 
App – appendix, e.g.: 1App – appendix to part 1; Pr – praefatio, e.g.: 4Pr – preface to 
part 4; AppCap – appendics caput, first chapter in the appendix to part 4, e.g.: 
4AppCap1. 
2 Cp. the issue of the journal Philosophy in the Contemporary World, 8 (2) (2001) 
which contain articles exploring different aspects of “environmental virtue ethics.” 
Also see Philip Cafaro & Ronald Sandler (eds.) Environmental Virtue Ethics. New 
York: Rowan and Littlefield (2005). 
3 Singer, P. (1975), p. 174. 
4 Regan, T. (1983), p. 243–248. 
5 Taylor, P. (1986) and Wetlesen, J. (1999). 
6 Leopold, A. (1949); Naess, A. (1983); and Johnson, L. (1991). 
7 The central passages in this connection are 4P37S1, AppCap7, 13 & 26 where 
Spinoza’s statements are thoroughly anthropocentric.  
8 I note that G. Lloyd (1999) is critical to this line of approach in relation to Spinoza’s 
texts. She argues that Spinoza’s philosophy, in spite of being a source of inspiration 
for several philosophers and others, is not suitable as a basis for an environmental 
ethic. Her problem is, however, that she seems to confuse the terms “anthropocentric” 
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with “anthropogenic.” An environmental ethic is necessarily always generated by 
human beings; hence, it must be anthropogenic. But an environmental ethic can be 
anthropogenic without being anthropocentric. I believe Lloyd is correct in denying 
that Spinoza can be taken as a patron for an environmental ethic. Nonetheless, his 
ethical thinking can be an immense source of inspiration and interpretation, such as 
for me and others. This seems also to be the case with Naess (1999). Naess devotes an 
entire article to answering some of Lloyd’s arguments. I subscribe in large part to the 
objections Naess makes in that article. See also Naess (1977); Mathews (1991), p. 77–
84, 87–90, 109–112 and 150–153; and Collier (1999) for other attempts to bring 
Spinoza in line with environmental philosophy. Moreover, it is interesting that 
Spinoza appears in the book by Joy A. Palmer (ed.) (2001) Fifty key thinkers on the 
Environment (London, Routledge). 
9 Cp. 4P4 and 4AppCap7. 
10 Spinoza uses the terms res singulares (singular things) and res particulares 
(particular things) as common terms for all “things.” I have found 12 occurrences of 
rei singularis (singular), 17 occurrences of res singulares (plural), and 2 occurrences 
of res particulares in the Ethics. 
11 Cp. 3P6–7, 9S, 11S and 13S. 
12 3P9S. 
13 I develop this distinction partly with reference to Paul Taylor’s distinction in Taylor 
(1986), p. 63, and partly with reference to Spinoza, especially 3P6–7 and 9S. 
14 3P11S. 
15 It should be noted that Freya Matthews (1991), much inspired by Spinoza I would 
guess, makes a case for the ascription of a conatus to supra-individual wholes but, as 
far as I can see, she doesn’t apply this term to species-populations. 
16 It should be noted that ideational possibilities (on the way to understanding God) 
are not so “evenly distributed” across conating beings, nor across individuals and 
wholes. In the present paper, I will not attempt to show in what way complex wholes 
have ideas. For my purposes it will suffice merely to assume that they have a conation 
or striving.
17 An interesting book in this connection is The Holographic Paradigm and Other 
Paradoxes by Ken Wilber (1982). 
18 2P13S. 
19 2P13SL7. There is probably something to gain from a more detailed comparison 
between Spinoza’s ideas and modern ecological thinking on this point, but I shall 
leave that to one side at present. 
20 Cp. Sayre, K. M (1976), ch. 3, 4, and 6 in connection with feedback and cybernetic 
systems. Relevant for holistic positions is also the contributions by Lovelock,(1979), 
p. ix–x, on the biosphere as a self-regulating and homeostatic system, and p. 48ff on 
cybernetic systems; and Rolston (1988) ch. 4–5.  
21 We may note that it sometimes is to the advantage of a certain species that its 
individual organisms are killed, a case in point being game management. We cannot 
pursue this discussion here but for further reference on relevant literature, see 
Lawrence Johnson’s holistic position, ascribing interests to species and ecosystems 
etc. See Johnson (1991), ch. 4 p. 148ff, 156, 157, 178ff; ch. 6 p. 202ff, 209, 216–217, 
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218ff; ch. 7 p. 238, 239 and p. 255–257. In addition, see Shaw (1997) p. 53–67, who 
maintains that ecosystems, such as rainforests inhabit a telos in the Aristotelian sense 
of the term.  
22 Paul Taylor (1986) uses the term “inherent worth” instead of the more commonly 
used “inherent value.” Presumably one could also use “inherent dignity” as is 
commonly used in connection with human rights and human worth. With regard to the 
terms “instrumental value,” “intrinsic value,” and “inherent value,” I think Jon 
Wetlesen has done a significant effort in attempting to clarify these concepts and his 
contribution is highly recommendable. See Wetlesen (1996) p. 61–87.  
23 As far as the distinction between “consequensialistic-teleological ethic” and 
“holistic-teleological ethic” goes, I follow Wetlesen (1996). 
24 4Df8. 
25 Cp. 1Df7 in combination with 2P11C and 5P42 & D & S. 
26 3P59S and 5P36. 
27 This pertains to Regan (1983); Taylor (1986); and Wetlesen (1999). 
28 Cp. Theodore Newcomb’s three criteria for agreement or consensus: (1) Each 
person cognizes and recognizes certain norms; (2) each person cognizes that the other 
concerned parties cognizes and recognizes these norms; (3) everyone agrees to this 
recognition of norms, that is, that they all agree on them. Moral agreement or validity 
can thus be said to rest on all parties cognizing that everyone recognizes the norms at 
stake. See Newcomb (1966) p. 94ff, 222–225, and 226–246.  
29 3P9S and 4Pr. 
30 See Korsgaard (1996) ch. 2 & 4. Her theory of reflective endorsement is also 
successfully applied by Wetlesen (1999). 
31 In fact, the theory of reflective endorsement as outlined here has a lot in common 
with Arne Naess’s theory of self-identification or theory of ecological self-realization 
(identification as a source of deep ecological attitudes). According to Naess, the more 
one comes to identify with nature and its parts, the more one will be motivated to 
protect nature and its constituting parts. 
32 2P35, 40S2 and 41. 
33 1Df5. 
34 1P8, 13, 15, 19S, 20 & C1, 24 & C, 25 & S & C, 26, 29, 34, 36, 2P3S, 45S, 3P1D, 
and 5A2.  
35 2P29S. 
36 2P47. 
37 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1, 13 & 6, 2. 
38 This pertains especially to 3P6–7 and 9S. 
39 2P40S2. In spite of important differences between the second and third kind of 
cognition, I will not make a case of these here. This would demand a more thorough 
investigation into the system of Spinoza than is necessary for the present argument. 
Thus, interpersonal holism refers to both the second (reason) and third (intuition) 
kinds of cognition. 
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40 The central passages supporting this view are 1Df3 & 5, A1 & 2, P13 & 15. 
41 5P24 
42 See Weber (1985) p. 35–104, and especially p. 78–83. I am grateful to Jon Wetlesen 
for mentioning this similarity between Spinoza and Bohm. 
43 Cp. 4P37: “The good which every man, who follows after virtue, desires for himself 
he will also desire for other men, and so much the more, in proportion as he has a 
greater understanding of God.” In this proposition Spinoza only mentions humans as 
being the objects of direct moral concern. But according to the present interpretation 
the hypothesis is that, insofar as the person has an adequate self-understanding, this 
normative prescription will apply to nonhumans too. So, while Spinoza’s statement in 
4P37 is strictly anthropocentric, I claim that the fundamental premises in his system 
allows for a different, nonanthropocentric interpretation. 
44 2P11C, 40S2, 45S, 3P59S, 5P23S, 29D & S, 36S, 37 and 42 & S. 
45 This consensus or agreement on norms follows from Spinoza’s theory of integration 
or harmony in part 4 of the Ethics (4P18, 29–37). The basic assumption here is that, 
insofar as a group of persons all have adequate cognition and active affects, they will 
converge in nature (convenire in natura) in the sense of agreement on the values and 
norms of reason, including the norm of moral status. This may serve as grounds for a 
recognition theory of moral validity along the lines developed by Jürgen Habermas in 
his discourse ethics, and Karl-Otto Apel in his transcendental pragmatics. For my own 
part, I think these and other approaches to moral validity may be of use for those 
interested in a shift from anthropocentrism to nonanthropocentrism. However, to spell 
out the further implications of this would take us too far afield here. For an argument 
in this direction, see Wetlesen (1999), who explicitly draws on modern discourse 
ethics and the rhetoric of Aristotle in his casuistic argument for a biocentric 
conception of moral status. 
46 Of course, in the case of human beings or persons, our attitudes of direct concern 
and respect are grounded on our ability to reason or make rational choices and 
valuations in addition to the mere ability to strive and feel joy or sorrow. 
47 See Naess, (1989) and Elgin (1993). 
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